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Infrastructures identified by the Office of Homeland Security are dependent upon the national telecommunications infrastructure for their daily operations -it is the backbone through which we engage in diplomacy, facilitate our economy, command and control our military, and process information -all primary sources of our national power.
A great paradox of the information age is that the very technology that makes us stronger makes us increasingly vulnerable. Widespread telecommunications interconnectivity poses enormous risks to our information systems, essential computer operations, and critical infrastructures such as power distribution, national defense, law enforcement, and government services. Potential adversaries, whether terrorist groups, criminal organizations, nation-states, or malicious insiders can develop relatively inexpensive cyber attack capabilities and attempt to exploit these risks. 1 Therefore, it is essential that the telecommunications infrastructure of the United States be adequately organized, effectively managed, appropriately resourced and securely protected. 
BRIEF HISTORY OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY
Much of what makes this subject both challenging and interesting is the tremendous speed of technological breakthroughs in the area of telecommunications and the apparently slow legal, organizational and management responses to these changes. To emphasize this point, a brief observation of significant technological advances in telecommunications over the last 150 years is helpful (see Table 1 ). The rapid pace of these innovations, coupled with the naturally cumbersome operating nature of large, bureaucratic governmental organizations, leads logically to a source of concern as stated by former President Clinton, particularly when applied in the context of our national security. …"In less than one generation, the information revolution and the introduction of the computer into virtually every dimension of our society has changed how our economy works, how we provide for our national security, and how we structure our everyday lives."
The first public message over a telegraph line.
1876
The telephone was patented.
1896
The invention of wireless and radio Communications.
1920
The Marconi Company begins sound broadcasting.
1939
The advent of the first modern day computer.
1963
The first Communications satellite put into orbit.
1969
The Internet.
1988
The first fiber optic cable across the Atlantic Ocean. 
Computer Intrusions
Clearly, the explosion in computer interconnectivity, while providing great benefits, also Others are commit attacks for industrial espionage, theft, revenge-seeking vandalism, or extortion. Some attacks may be committed for intelligence collections, reconnaissance, or creation of a future attack capability. The perpetrators range from juveniles to potentially hostile militaries. What has emerged in the last several years is an increase in the seriousness of the threat.
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The United States is exposed to such attacks because it has become dependent upon computer networks for many essential services, while paying insufficient attention to protecting those networks. Water, electricity, gas, rail, aviation, and other critical functions are directed by computer controls over vast telecommunications networks and expansive information systems.
The possibility exists that adversaries could exploit these networked infrastructures, not necessarily for destruction, but for large-scale disruption prior to a more kinetic form of attack.
Information Warfare
One of the great asymmetric threats identified by American defense planners, Information Agency for example. 13 All of these outages were not the result of a high-tech cyber attack, but rather were traced to defects in the wires, switches and nodes that make up the physical electronic nervous system of these agencies and their individual telecommunications infrastructure.
Reliance on industry
Another notable vulnerability is the reliance of the infrastructure on commercial services.
This reliance and mutual dependence presents a mix of governmental and industry based motivations. Currently, approximately 95% of telecommunications vital for our national security travel over commercial telecommunications networks. 14 We are presented with the traditional conflicting interests of politics, national defense and the financial bottom line. One might suggest that these conflicting interests and motivations raise significant concerns ranging from bureaucratic organizational structures and inefficient management to wasted resources and ultimately, national security issues.
Large networks
Beyond the purely physical dimensions of vulnerability associated with the national telecommunications infrastructure are the more intangible vulnerabilities of large networks
themselves. In an article entitled Confronting the limits of Networks, Andrew McAfee and
Francois-Xavier Oliveau describe five phenomena that can affect large networks negatively.
They are: Saturation (the point where the number of different resources is maximized), Cacophony (when too many users of a network make interaction difficult… a crowded chat room for example), Contamination (spam or offensive content), Clustering (when users consistently use only one portion of a network), and Search Costs (as a network becomes larger, it simply takes more time to navigate). Their basic argument is that large and expanding networks are good up to a certain point. Beyond that point, however, leaders and managers must understand that there are significant risks involved. 15 They argue that Metcalfe's Law, which states that the "value of a network increases in proportion to the square of the number of people using it", does not always hold true. 16 Similarly, the NSA example referred to above appears to have been more managerial than physical in nature according to NSA director Lieutenant General Michael V. Hayden. He pointed out that NSA at that time had five largely autonomous directorates and 68 e-mail systems at Fort Mead alone.
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In the current environment, these are only a few examples of the threats and vulnerabilities facing the national telecommunications infrastructure of the United States.
Concern over these threats and vulnerabilities permeate society as evidenced in the media with such front-page headlines as this one, in The Washington Post last June: "Cyber-Attacks by Al Qaeda Feared, Terrorists at Threshold of Using Internet as Tool of Bloodshed, Experts Say."
Unfortunately, the vulnerabilities could become more acute and the threat could mature faster than adequate defenses could thwart them.
DEFENSE ATTEMPTS
Attempts to identify and protect against these threats and vulnerabilities are increasing in society, within the political realm, and in the defense department. Ironically however, the best defenses against massive attacks and failures against the national telecommunications and other critical infrastructures may be happening entirely by accident. Many organizations have developed proprietary or stove-pipe systems, unique to their branch of government. While these systems produce tremendous inefficiencies, information sharing roadblocks and overwhelming interoperability issues, they do provide a form of protection. 18 That is, if only a few number of employees are familiar with a certain software package, or how to operate certain hardwareintrusions become difficult.
SOURCES OF AUTHORITY IN TELECOMMUNICAITONS
The idea of a fully integrated, interoperable, functional, and secure national telecommunications infrastructure is indeed a challenge. Federal organizations involved with this complex effort derive their authority and responsibilities from a variety of laws, regulations and federal policy documents. Therefore, to understand the organizations themselves it is necessary to examine executive orders, legislation, and directives which provide the sources of authority for organizations responsible for the national telecommunications infrastructure of the United States. A brief summary of the more relevant sources of authority for telecommunications organizations is shown in Table 2 .
Source of Authority Description
Executive Table 3 Not the men and women in uniform, but the uniformity of thought and action that we too often impose on them. Seventeen layers of bureaucracy within DOD are too many. Some of these levels of management are not contributing a lot of value added. One of the benefits of decentralizing decision making is to flatten organizations and eliminate less productive layers.
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-Secretary of Defense, Rumsfeld.
The National Communications System
Overall, DOD facilitates its role in the national telecommunications infrastructure through the National Communications System or NCS. The NCS is arguably the central nervous system of the national telecommunications infrastructure, particularly in the area of emergency preparedness and emergency response. In 1963, under the direction of John F. Kennedy, the NCS's charter was to "link together, improve, and extend, on an evolutionary basis, the communications facilities and components of the various Federal agencies… to provide necessary communications for the Federal Government under all conditions ranging from a normal situation to national emergencies and international crisis, including nuclear attack." However, the NCS is not an organization in and of itself, but rather a system which is managed by the DOD. Therefore, the application of the NCS, as a system, could be centralized, while management of the NCS could, in theory, be more decentralized.
Change in oversight of the NCS
Apparently, the current administration is again looking at influencing the mission of the The DOD needs to be overhauled. The growth in staff and staff activities has created mounting confusion and delay. The failure to outsource or privatize many defense support activities wastes huge sums of money. The programming and budgeting process is not guided by effective strategic planning. The weapons acquisition process is so hobbled by excessive laws, regulation, and oversight strictures that it can neither recognize nor seize opportunities for major innovation, and its procurement bureaucracy weakens a defense industry that is already in a state of financial crisis.
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The move of the NCS from DOD to OHS is not the solution to achieving the goals of a Volcker's comments were based on a report by the National Commission on the Public Service, which he chaired. The report called for sweeping reorganization of the federal government, as did a report by the U.S. Commission on National Security/21 st Century three years earlier. 33 That commission found that "there is a critical need to reshape the DOD to meet the challenges of the 21 st Century security environment." And the Commission warned that the U.S. intelligence capabilities were hindered by "organizational constraints that limit the Intelligence Community's ability to optimally address emerging security threats." All of these recommendations were made prior to the attacks on September 11 th .
As we delve further into the more recent Volcker report, it provides some concrete and supportable recommendations that should be applied to the organizations responsible for the national telecommunications infrastructure. It recommends that "The federal government should be reorganized into a limited number of mission-related executive departments." As shown in Table 2 , too many agencies share responsibilities that could be combined or eliminated, and the implied requirement to be in constant coordination, both internally and externally, delays substantive and timely decisions. Again, using the DOD as indicative of the larger federal structure, the following are examples of potential organizational changes.
A critical first step in undertaking any organizational restructuring is a valid assessment of organizational capabilities coupled with a solid definition of core organizational competencies. Command and Control are broad, all encompassing, and embedded in DOD's "core identity".
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Organizations are often handicapped from adapting because of their core identity. Decisions are made and strategy is developed based on the organization's history which is reinforced over time. When organizations form an identity, similar to an individual's life style, ethnic group or profession, this identity tends to influence how employees perceive the environment and address issues. 35 The change from OSD/C3I to OSD/T better defines the core mission of the office and provides focus on the DOD portion of the national telecommunications infrastructure.
This office would provide leadership, set policy, articulate rules, and publish guidance. Telecommunications-and computers-will continue to drive change, just as manufacturing did during the industrial period. We are laying the foundations for an international information highway system. In telecommunications we are moving to a single worldwide information network, just as economically we are becoming one global marketplace. We are moving toward the capability to communicate anything to anyone, anywhere, by any form-voice, data, text, or image-at the speed of light.
42
The opportunities presented by a robust, reliable, and secure national telecommunications infrastructure are numerous and cross virtually all aspects of day-to-day life, the economy and democracy. The opportunity presented by advanced telecommunications networks on the national and global economy (arguably the United States' Center of Gravity) is overwhelming.
Electronic currency transfer systems allow banks to move capital around at a moment's notice, avoiding interest rate differentials, taking advantage of favorable exchange rates, and avoiding political unrest. 43 For example, Citicorp's telecommunications Network allows it to trade $200 billion daily in foreign exchange markets around the world. Similar networks give the global banking community the ability to move money with light speed, at an estimated $1.5 trillion daily.
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Secondly, the opportunity presented by advanced telecommunications networks in a democratic society is already proven. If a person is literate and has access to a television or computer, he or she possesses the means to be well informed about political issues and candidates. Additionally, this technology has the potential to transcend all of the ethnic and race issues traditionally associated with politics. It simply gives people a voice in politics through myriad of means and enables more people to dialogue in the political realm. In 1995 the Benton Foundation presented a project briefing entitled "Telecommunications and Democracy," in which they highlight six areas that advancing telecommunications technology can influence and enhance the democratic process. 45 These areas include the ability to "deepen people's understanding of policy issues" and to "broaden participation in deliberations on political issues."
Again, the economy and the democratic process are just two areas of opportunity presented to a nation connected through a robust, secure, and reliable telecommunications infrastructure; there are countless more. "It is not by chance that communications and community come from the same Latin root. Any system that enhances or denies our ability to learn from and talk to one another necessarily affects our social fabric. "
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This paper discusses evidence that shows that as the rapid pace of IT continues to increase exponentially, so do the associated vulnerabilities, threats, and opportunities. One of the most significant vulnerabilities in this electronically interconnected environment, is the organizational construct of our national telecommunications infrastructure. This vulnerability has not gone unrecognized as evidenced by the recent shift of the NCS from DOD to the Office of Homeland Security. But, the dramatic changes in the world since the end of the cold war have not been accompanied by any other major institutional changes in the U.S. governmentparticularly in the area of telecommunications. Clearly change of this nature is a daunting, complex, and bureaucratic endeavor. It will take bold initiatives by our political institutions, integrated support and cooperation from industry, legislative reform, and time.
Organizational reform is not a panacea. There is no perfect organizational design, no flawless managerial fix. The reason is that organizations are made out of people, and people invariably devise informal means of dealing with one another in accord with the accidents of personality and temperament. Even excellent organizational structure cannot make impetuous or mistaken leaders patient or wise, but poor organizational design can make good leaders less effective. …Sound organization is important. It can ensure that problems reach their proper level of decision quickly and efficiently and can balance the conflicting imperatives inherent in any national security decision-system.
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Between senior involvement and expert input, between speed and the need to consider a variety of views, between tactical flexibility and strategic consistency, there are many conflicting imperatives involved in related decision making. Talk is cheap. Let us take appropriate informed steps now to refine our national telecommunications infrastructure from the organizational paradox that it is, to the model 21 st century organization it must be.
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